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MEV: the cost that never appears on a receipt

Searchers reorder transactions for profit. A sandwich buys before you and sells after. What makes you a target and how to be a worse one.

What it is Profit from ordering transactions within a block
Sandwich bound Exactly your slippage tolerance — nothing more
Best defence Tight tolerance, smaller clips, deeper pools, private routing

FBT Swap

What you should know

Maximal extractable value is the profit available from choosing the order of transactions in a block. Some of it is harmless arbitrage that keeps prices aligned. Some of it is taken directly from a specific user, and sandwiching is that kind.

It does not show up as a fee. It shows up as an execution price slightly worse than it should have been, which is why most people never notice paying it.

How a sandwich works

Your pending swap is visible before it is included. A searcher submits a buy of the same token ahead of yours, your trade executes at the price their buy created, and they sell immediately after into the price your trade created.

Their profit is bounded by your slippage tolerance. Everything they take was inside the band you publicly agreed to accept.

What makes a trade worth attacking

Size relative to pool depth, a generous slippage tolerance, and a pair volatile enough that nobody questions the result. A small swap on a deep stable pair is not worth the gas to attack; a large swap on a thin pair with 5% tolerance is.

The attacker needs your transaction to be visible and your tolerance to leave room. Remove either and the attack stops being profitable.

Practical defences

Set tolerance to the smallest value that reliably executes for that pair. Split large orders so no single transaction is worth sandwiching. Prefer deeper pools, which may mean a different supported network for the same pair.

Where a private transaction route is available from your wallet or the network, it removes mempool visibility entirely, which is the strongest available defence.

The part no interface can fix

No front end can promise MEV protection it does not control. Block ordering belongs to validators and builders, and an interface that claims to eliminate extraction is overstating what it can do.

FBT Swap shows the quote, the price impact and your tolerance before you sign, and does not add a hidden spread of its own. That is the honest boundary: visibility and a tight band, not immunity.

At a glance

At a glance

What it is

Profit from ordering transactions within a block

Sandwich bound

Exactly your slippage tolerance — nothing more

Best defence

Tight tolerance, smaller clips, deeper pools, private routing

Visible as

A worse fill, never a line item

FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Clear answers before you decide.

Was I sandwiched?

Check the block your swap landed in on the explorer. A buy of the same token immediately before yours and a sell immediately after, from the same address, is the signature. Receiving less than quoted on its own is not proof.

Does a low slippage tolerance stop MEV?

It shrinks the profit available from sandwiching you, often below the attacker's gas cost, which removes the incentive. It does not affect other forms of extraction such as back-running arbitrage.

Is all MEV an attack?

No. Arbitrage that realigns a stale pool price benefits everyone trading into that pool afterwards, and liquidations are a necessary function of lending markets. Sandwiching is the subset taken from a specific user.

Risk notice

Crypto assets are volatile and on-chain transactions cannot be reversed. You can lose money, including all of it. Nothing here is financial advice.